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Abstract
The standard New Keynesian model with staggered wage setting
is shown to imply a simple dynamic relation between wage in￿ ation
and unemployment. Under some assumptions, that relation takes a
form similar to that found in empirical wage equations￿ starting from
Phillips￿(1958) original work￿ and may thus be viewed as providing
some theoretical foundations to the latter. The structural wage equa-
tion derived here is shown to account reasonably well for the comove-
ment of wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. econ-
omy, even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate of
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The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a new popular framework
for monetary policy analysis, the so called New Keynesian (NK) model. The
new framework combines some of the ingredients of Real Business Cycle
theory (e.g. dynamic optimization, general equilibrium) with others that
have a distinctive Keynesian ￿ avor (e.g. monopolistic competition, nominal
rigidities).
Many important properties of the NK model hinge on the speci￿cation
of its wage-setting block. While basic versions of that model, intended for
classroom exposition, assume fully ￿ exible wages and perfect competition in
labor markets, the larger, more realistic versions (including those developed
in-house at di⁄erent central banks and policy institutions) typically assume
staggered nominal wage setting which, following the lead of Erceg, Hender-
son and Levin (2000), are modeled in a way symmetric to price setting.1
The degree of nominal wage rigidities and other features of wage setting play
an important role in determining the response of the economy to monetary
and other shocks. Furthermore, the coexistence of price and wage rigidi-
ties has important implications for the optimal design of monetary policy.2
Yet, and despite the central role of the wage-setting block in the NK model,
the amount of work aimed at assessing its empirical relevance has been sur-
1See, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003,2008) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005). For a descriptions of versions of those models developed at policy institutions,
see Christo⁄el, Coenen, and Warne (2008), Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2007), and Erceg,
Guerrieri and Gust (2006), among others.
2See Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), Woodford (2003, chapter 6) or Gal￿ (2008,
chapter 6) for a detailed discussion of the policy implications of the coexistence of nominal
wage and price stickiness.
1prisingly scant.3 This is in stark contrast with the recent but already large
empirical literature on price in￿ ation dynamics and ￿rms￿pricing patterns,
which has been motivated to a large extent by the desire to evaluate the
price-setting block of the NK model.4
The present paper seeks to ￿ll part of that gap, by providing evidence on
the NK model￿ s ability to account for the observed patterns of wage in￿ ation
in the U.S. economy. In order to do so, I reformulate the standard version
of the NK wage equation in terms of a (suitably de￿ned) unemployment
rate. The main advantage of that reformulation is the observability of the
associated driving force (the unemployment rate), which contrasts with the
inherent unobservability of the wage markup or the output gap, which are the
driving forces in standard formulations of the NK wage in￿ ation equation.
The staggered wage setting model ￿ la Calvo (1983) embedded in stan-
dard versions of the New Keynesian framework is shown to imply a simple
dynamic relation between wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate, which
I refer to as the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve. Under certain assump-
tions, that relation takes the same form as the original equation of Phillips
(1958). Furthermore, in the presence of wage indexation to past in￿ ation ￿ an
assumption often made in extensions of the basic model￿the resulting wage
dynamics are consistent with a speci￿cation often used in applied work (e.g.
Blanchard and Katz (1999)). The analysis developed here can thus be seen
3A recent exception is Sbordone (2006).
4See, e.g. Gal￿ and Gertler (1999), Gal￿, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2001), Sbordone
(2002) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) for examples of papers using aggregate data.
Micro evidence on price-setting patterns and its implications for aggregate models can be
found in Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Mackowiak and
Smets (2008), among others.
2as providing some theoretical foundations for those speci￿cations, as well as
a structural interpretation to its coe¢ cients.
In the second part of the paper I turn to the empirical evidence, and show
how the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve accounts reasonably well for
the behavior of wage in￿ ation in the U.S. economy, even under the strong
assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment. In particular, the
model can account for the strong negative correlation between wage in￿ ation
and the unemployment rate observed since the mid-1980s. On the other
hand, the lack of a signi￿cant correlation between the same variables for the
postwar period as a whole can be explained as a consequence of the large
￿ uctuations in price in￿ ation in and around the 1970s, in combination with
wage indexation to past CPI in￿ ation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model of staggered nominal wage setting. Section 3 introduces
the measure of unemployment latent in that model, and reformulates the
wage in￿ ation equation in terms of that variable. Section 4 provides an
empirical assessment of the model￿ s implied relation between wage in￿ ation
and unemployment using postwar U.S. data. Section 5 concludes.
2 Staggered Wage Setting and Wage In￿ a-
tion Dynamics
This section introduces a variant of the staggered wage setting model orig-
inally developed in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; henceforth, EHL).
That model (and extensions thereof) constitutes the core of the monetary
DSGE frameworks that have become part of the toolkit for policy analysis in
3both academic and policy circles. The variant presented here assumes that
labor is indivisible, with all variations in hired labor input taking place at
the extensive margin (i.e. in the form of variations in employment). The as-
sumption of indivisible labor leads to a de￿nition of unemployment consistent
with its empirical counterpart.
The model assumes a (large) representative household with a contin-
uum of members represented by the unit square and indexed by a pair
(i;j) 2 [0;1] ￿ [0;1]. The ￿rst dimension, indexed by i 2 [0;1], represents
the type of labor service in which a given household member is specialized.
The second dimension, indexed by j 2 [0;1], determines his disutility from
work. The latter is given by ￿tj’ if he is employed and zero otherwise,
where ’ ￿ 0 determines the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work, and
￿t > 0 is an exogenous preference shifter which, due to its impact on labor
supply (discussed below), is referred to as a "labor supply shock".in what
follows. Furthermore, utility is logarithmic in consumption and there is full
risk sharing among household members, as in Merz (1995) and much of the
subsequent literature.
The household period utility corresponds to the integral of its members￿
utilities, and is thus given by













where Ct denotes household consumption, and Nt(i) 2 [0;1] is the fraction of
members specialized in type i labor who are employed in period t. Below I
discuss the robustness of the main ￿ndings to a generalization of the previous
4utility function that is consistent with (empirically more plausible) smaller
wealth e⁄ects on labor supply.






subject to a sequence of budget constraints
PtCt + QtBt ￿ Bt￿1 +
Z 1
0
Wt(i)Nt(i) di + ￿t (1)
where Pt is the price of the consumption bundle, Wt(i) is the nominal wage
for labor of type i, Bt represents purchases of a nominally riskless one-period
bond (at a price Qt), and ￿t is a lump-sum component of income (which
may include, among other items, dividends from ownership of ￿rms). The
above sequence of period budget constraints is supplemented with a solvency
condition which prevents the household from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
As in EHL, and following the formalism of Calvo (1983), workers supply-
ing a labor service of a given type (or a union representing them) get to reset
their (nominal) wage with probability 1￿￿w each period. That probability is
independent of the time elapsed since they last reset their wage, in addition
to being independent across labor types. Thus, a fraction of workers ￿w keep
their wage unchanged in any given period, making that parameter a natural
index of nominal wage rigidities. Once the wage has been set, the quantity of
workers employed is determined unilaterally by ￿rms, with households will-
ingly meeting that demand (to the extent that the wage remains above the
disutility of work for the marginal worker), by sending its specialized workers
with the lowest work disutility.
5When reoptimizing their wage in period t, workers choose a wage W ￿
t in
order to maximize household utility (as opposed to their individual utility),
subject to a sequence of isoelastic demand schedules for their labor type,
and the usual sequence of household ￿ ow budget constraints.5 The ￿rst
















where Nt+kjt denotes the quantity demanded in period t + k of a labor type
whose wage is being reset in period t, MRSt+kjt ￿ ￿t+kCt+kN
’
t+kjt is the
relevant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and employment
in period t + k, and Mw ￿ ￿w
￿w￿1 is the desired (or ￿ exible wage) markup,
with ￿w denoting the (constant) wage elasticity of demand for the services of
each labor type.
Log-linearizing the above optimality condition around a perfect foresight
zero in￿ ation steady state, and using lower case letters to denote the logs of













where ￿w ￿ logMw. Note that in the absence of nominal wage rigidities
(￿w = 0) we have w￿
t = wt = ￿w + mrst + pt, implying a constant markup
￿w of the wage wt over the price-adjusted marginal rate of substitution,
mrst + pt. When nominal wage rigidities are present, new wages are set
instead as a constant markup ￿w over a weighted average of current and
expected future price-adjusted marginal rates of substitution.
5Details of the derivation of the optimal wage setting condition can be found in EHL
(2000).
6Letting mrst ￿ ct+’ nt+￿t denote the economy￿ s average (log) marginal
rate of substitution, where ￿t ￿ log￿t, we can write
mrst+kjt = mrst+k + ’(nt+kjt ￿ nt+k) (3)
= mrst+k ￿ ￿w’(w
￿
t ￿ wt+k)
Furthermore, log-linearizing the expression for aggregate wage index around
a zero in￿ ation steady state we obtain
wt = ￿wwt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿w)w
￿
t (4)
As in EHL (2000), we can combine equations (2) through (4) and derive










t ￿ wt ￿ wt￿1 is wage in￿ ation, ￿w
t ￿ wt ￿ pt ￿ mrst denotes the
(average) wage markup, and ￿w ￿
(1￿￿w)(1￿￿￿w)
￿w(1+￿w’) > 0. In words, wage in￿ ation
depends positively on expected one period ahead wage in￿ ation and nega-
tively on the deviation of the average wage markup from its desired value.6











i.e. wage in￿ ation is proportional to the discounted sum of expected devia-
tions of current and future average wage markups from their desired levels.
Intuitively, if average wage markups are below (above) their desired level,
6Note that the previous equation is the wage analog to the price in￿ ation equation
resulting from a model with staggered price setting ￿ la Calvo. See Gal￿ and Gertler
(1999) and Sbordone (2002) for a derivation and empirical assessment.
7workers that have a chance to reset their wage will tend to adjust it upward
(downward), thus generating positive (negative) wage in￿ ation.
Estimated versions of the model above found in the literature generally
allow for automatic indexation to price in￿ ation of the wages that are not
reoptimized in any given period. Here I assume the following indexation rule:
wt+kjt = wt+k￿1jt + ￿￿
p
t+k￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
p + g (7)
for k = 1;2;3;:::where wt+kjt is the period t + k (log) wage for workers who
last re-optimized their wage in period t (with wtjt ￿ w￿
t), ￿
p
t is the measure
of price in￿ ation to which wages are indexed, ￿p denotes steady state price
in￿ ation, and g is the rate of growth of productivity (and real wages) in














where ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)￿p + g).




t ￿ pt ￿ pt￿1
(e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007)), it is important to note that the model
allows for in￿ ation measures other than the one-period lagged in￿ ation as an











t￿3) as a "smoother" alternative
indexing variable.
83 Wage In￿ ation and Unemployment: A New
Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve
Next I introduce unemployment explicitly in the model above.7 Consider
household member (i;j), specialized in type i labor and with disutility of
work ￿tj’. Using household welfare as a criterion, and taking as given current
labor market conditions (as summarized by the prevailing wage for his labor






i.e. whenever the real wage prevailing in his trade is above his disutility from
working, expressed in terms of consumption using the household￿ s marginal
valuation of the latter.
Thus, the marginal supplier of type i labor (employed or unemployed),





Taking logs and integrating over i we obtain
wt ￿ pt = ct + ’ lt + ￿t (9)
where lt ￿
R 1
0 lt(i)di can be interpreted as the model￿ s implied aggregate
participation or labor force, and wt ￿
R 1
0 wt(i)di is the average wage, both
expressed in logs.
7The general approach builds on Gal￿ (1996). Recent applications of that approach to
the New Keynesian model can be found in Blanchard and Gal￿ (2007) and, more closely
related (although developed independently), Casares (2009).
9I de￿ne the unemployment rate ut as
ut ￿ lt ￿ nt (10)
which, for rates of unemployment of the magnitude observed in the postwar
U.S. economy, is a close (and algebraically convenient) approximation to the
more conventional measure (Lt ￿ Nt)=Lt. Note that the latter corresponds
to the "o¢ cial" de￿nition of the unemployment rate in the U.S. under the
assumption that "active search" (i.e. signaling oneself as available for work)
is needed in order to be hired, with that search activity generating a neglible
utility cost.
Combining (9) and (10) with the expression for the average wage markup
￿w
t ￿ (wt ￿pt)￿(ct +’nt +￿t) used above yields the following simple linear
relation between the wage markup and the unemployment rate
￿
w
t = ’ut (11)
Let us de￿ne the natural rate of unemployment, un
t , as the rate of un-
employment that would prevail in the absence of nominal wage rigidities. It
follows from the assumption of a constant desired wage markup that un
t is






Thus, in the framework above unemployment is a consequence of work-
ers￿market power (i.e. of the wage being above their perfectly competitive
level), while unemployment ￿ uctuations result from the slow adjustment of
wages. Figure 1 represents the relation between the wage markup and the
unemployment rate using a simple diagram of the labor market.
10Finally, combining (5), (11), and (12) we obtain the following New Key-





t+1g ￿ ￿w’(ut ￿ u
n) (13)
Note that the simple linear relation between the wage markup and unem-
ployment derived in this section holds irrespective of the details of the wage
setting process. In particular, it also holds in the presence of wage indexation
as described in equation (7). In that case we can derive the implied wage
Phillips curve by combining equations (8) and (11) to obtain:
￿
w






tg ￿ ￿w’(ut ￿ u
n) (14)
which I refer to henceforth as the augmented NKWPC.
3.1 Relation to the original wage Phillips curve
In his seminal paper, Phillips (1958) uncovered the existence of a strong in-
verse empirical relation between wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate in
the U.K. over the period 1861-1957. His analysis was subsequently replicated
using U.S. data by Samuelson and Solow (1960), who showed that a similar
empirical relation had been prevalent in the U.S., with the exception of the
New Deal period and the early years of World War I. Much of subsequent
empirical work turned its focus instead to the relation between price in￿ ation
and unemployment, usually in the context of a discussion of NAIRU and its
changes (e.g. Gordon (1997) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997)).8
8Gordon (1997) claims that the shift in focus towards price in￿ ation has been "deliber-
ate." In his words, "...[t]he earlier ￿xation on wages was a mistake. The relation of prices
to wages has changed over time...The Fed￿ s goal is to control in￿ ation, not wage growth,
and models with separate wage growth and price markup equations do not perform as well
as the [price in￿ ation] equation...in which wages are only implicit...."
11Note that, like the original Phillips (1958) curve, the NKWPC establishes
a relationship between wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate. But two
key di⁄erences with respect to Phillips￿original curve (and some of its sub-
sequent amendments) are worth emphasizing.
Firstly, (13) is a microfounded structural relation between wage in￿ a-
tion and unemployment, with coe¢ cients that are functions of parameters
that have a structural interpretation, and which are independent of the pol-
icy regime.9 In particular, the steepness of the slope of the implied wage
in￿ ation-unemployment curve (given expected wage in￿ ation) is decreasing
in the degree of wage rigidity ￿w (which is inversely related to ￿w). In the
limit, as ￿w approaches zero (the case of full wage ￿ exibility), the curve be-
comes vertical. Also, the slope of the (￿w;u) relation is decreasing in the size
of the Frisch labor supply elasticity (which corresponds to the inverse of ’).
That structural nature of (13) stands in contrast with the purely empirical
basis of Phillips (1958) original curve, whose only theoretical underpinning
was the plausibility of the principle that "when demand for labour is high
and there are very few unemployed we should expect employers to bid wage
rates up quite rapidly...".10
Secondly, note that (13) implies that wage in￿ ation is a forward looking
variable, which is inversely related to current unemployment but also to its
expected future path. This feature, which re￿ ects the forward looking nature
9Needless to say this is only true to the extent that one is willing to take the assumptions
of the Calvo formalism literally, including the exogeneity of parameter ￿w.
10Phillips (1958) also emphasized the likely existence of nonlinearities due to workers￿
reluctance "to o⁄er their services at less than the prevailing rates when the demand for
labour is low and unemployment is high, so that wage rates fall only very slowly." In the
analysis of the present paper, as in standard versions of the New Keynesian model, the
possible existence of such asymmetries is ignored.







k Etf(ut+k ￿ u
n)g (15)
which contrasts with the static, contemporaneous nature of the original
Phillips curve, in which expectations play no role.
Next I brie￿ y discuss two extensions of the previous framework. The ￿rst
one allows for changes over time in desired markups, whereas the second
introduces a speci￿cation of preferences that allows for limited short run
wealth e⁄ects on labor supply.
3.2 An Extension with Time-Varying Desired Wage
Markups
Estimated, medium-scale versions of the New Keynesian model often allow
for a time-varying, exogenous desired wage markup, f￿w
t g (see, e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2003, 2007)). In that case, the wage in￿ ation equation (shown






















’ denotes the (now time-varying) natural rate of unemploy-
ment. Variations in the latter variable, resulting from changes in desired
wage markups, may thus potentially shift the relation between wage in￿ a-
tion and the unemployment rate.





t+1g ￿ ￿w’ut + vt (17)
vt ￿ ￿w￿w
t . The previous speci￿cation can be compared against one often
used in the literature which relies on (16) combined with the de￿nition of





t+1g ￿ ￿w(wt ￿ pt ￿ ct ￿ ’nt) + v
0
t
where now the error term is given by v0
t ￿ ￿w￿w
t + ￿w￿t, i.e. it is in￿ uenced
by both wage markup shocks and preference shocks. That property contrasts
with (17), whose error term captures exclusively wage markup shocks, but
not preference shocks (even though the latter have been allowed for in the
model). This feature should in principle allow one to overcome the identi￿ca-
tion problem raised by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) in their critique
of current New Keynesian models. The potential advantage of the present
formulation is discussed in detail in Gal￿, Smets and Wouters (2010), who
re-estimate the Smets and Wouters (2007) model using an unemployment-
based wage equation, and re-assess some of the ￿ndings therein in light of
the new estimates.
3.3 Robustness to a Speci￿cation of Preferences with
Limited Short-Run Wealth E⁄ects
The speci￿cation of preferences assumed above, while analytically conve-
nient, has implications on labor supply that are rather implausible from an
empirical viewpoint. In particular, the strong wealth e⁄ects implied by the
14logarithmic speci￿cation, while seemingly needed in order to remain consis-
tent with balanced growth, are likely to be counterfactual. This becomes
clear by looking at the labor participation equation (9), which implies that
the wage-consumption ratio (wt￿pt￿ct) should be positively correlated to la-
bor participation, at least conditional on shocks other than preference shocks
being the source of ￿ uctuations. In postwar U.S. data, and possibly due to
the wage rigidities of the kind emphasized in the present paper, wt￿pt￿ct is
clearly countercyclical, while participation is procyclical (albeit moderately
so). Thus, and unless one is willing to attribute a dominant weight to pref-
erence shocks as a source of cyclical ￿ uctuations in wages, consumption and
participation, equation (9) provides an unsatisfactory account of ￿ uctuations
in the labor force.11
Here I consider a simple extension of the preferences assumed above that
can in principle overcome that problem, by allowing for arbitrarily small
short-run wealth e⁄ects while remaining consistent with a balanced growth
path.12 Thus, individual utility from consumption is assumed to be given
by ￿t logCt(i;j), where ￿t is a preference shifter taken as exogenously given
by each household, but determined by the ratio of aggregate consumption Ct




t with # 2 [0;1) is a (one-sided) long run trend for aggregate
11The previous observation is closely related to other implausible predictions of macro
models that rely on similar preferences, including the negative impact on activity of higher
anticipated productivity, as emphasized by the recent literature on "news shocks."
12Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2009) follow a similar approach to deal with the
strong wealth e⁄ect problem. In a subsequent paper (Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin
(2010)) the same authors propose an alternative model, where the probability of ￿nding
a job is increasing in search e⁄ort, and where imperfect risk sharing among individuals is
a consequence of the unobservability of e⁄ort. In that framework the labor force comoves
positively with employment and negatively with unemployment.
15consumption. Implicit in the speci￿cation above is the assumption that the
marginal utility of individual consumption rises in response to a boom in
aggregate consumption (relative to its trend), possibly due to a "keeping up
with the Joneses" e⁄ect.
Under the above assumptions, aggregation of individual utilities yields
the following period utility for the household






The derivation of the wage in￿ ation equation (5) (or (8), in the pres-
ence of indexation) carries over to this case, with the relevant marginal
rate of substitution in the optimal wage setting problem now being given
by MRSt+kjt ￿ (￿t+k=￿t+k)Ct+kN
’
t+kjt. Note, however, that in a symmetric
equilibrium Ct = Ct for all t, which allows us to write the equilibrium (log)
marginal rate of substitution as mrst = zt + ’nt + ￿t, where zt ￿ logZt
evolves over time according to zt = #zt￿1 + (1 ￿ #)ct. The equations for the
average wage markup and participation are now respectively given by
￿
w
t ￿ (wt ￿ pt) ￿ (zt + ’nt + ￿t)
wt ￿ pt = zt + ’lt + ￿t
which can be combined to yield the same simple proportional relation be-
tween the wage markup and the unemployment rate as above, i.e. ￿w
t = ’ut.
Note that the previous speci￿cation is still consistent with a balanced growth
path since, in the long run, zt will grow at the same rate as consumption.
In the short run, however, the impact of changes in consumption on the
marginal rate of substitution may be rendered arbitrarily small by increasing
16parameter #, thus yielding a more plausible labor supply model. Yet, and
most importantly for the purposes of the present paper, the speci￿cation of
the NKWPC in (13) (or (14)) remains una⁄ected.13
3.4 A Reduced Form Representation for the NKWPC
In this subsection, and in order to obtain some additional intuition about
the joint dynamics for wage in￿ ation and unemployment, I derive a simple
reduced form representation of the NKWPC. Let us thus assume that the
unemployment rate follows a stationary AR(2) process. As discussed below,
this process turns out to provide a reasonably good approximation to the
behavior of U.S. unemployment in the postwar period. Formally,
b ut = ￿1b ut￿1 + ￿2b ut￿2 + "t (18)
where b ut ￿ ut ￿un and f"tg is white noise. Combining (18) with (14) yields
the wage in￿ ation equation
￿
w
t = ￿ + ￿￿
p
t￿1 +  0b ut +  1b ut￿1 (19)
where
 0 ￿ ￿
￿w’
1 ￿ ￿(￿1 + ￿￿2)
13An identical robustness result can be shown to obtain under a period utility function












where Zt = Z#
t￿1C
1￿#
t . This is the speci￿cation adopted in Gal￿, Smets and Wouters
(2010). The non-separability of the previous speci￿cation for household utility, however,
prevents one from interpreting it as the aggregation of the utilities of individual household
members.
17 1 ￿ ￿
￿w’￿￿2







t￿1 ￿ ￿b ut ￿  1￿b ut (20)
where ￿ ￿ ￿( 0 +  1).
Estimates of the unemployment process (18) using postwar U.S. data
unambiguously point to the following properties: ￿1 > 1 , ￿1 < ￿2 < 0
and 0 < ￿1 + ￿1 < 1, the latter being a requirement for stationarity If
those inequalities hold then we have  0 < 0,  1 > 0, and ￿ > 0. Thus,
under the previous assumptions and conditional on the relevant lagged price
in￿ ation measure used for indexation purposes, wage in￿ ation should respond
negatively to both the level and the ￿rst di⁄erence of the unemployment
rate, with the size of that response being a well de￿ned function of structural
parameters, including those characterizing the process for the unemployment
rate.
Interestingly, a speci￿cation like (20) has often been proposed and used in
empirical applications (e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1999)), as well as in main-
stream undergraduate textbooks (though the latter typically omit lagged
unemployment). In fact, in his seminal paper Phillips (1958) himself argued
that it was plausible that wage in￿ ation would depend negatively on both the
level and the change of the unemployment rate, since both captured impor-
tant dimensions of the degree of tightness or excess demand in labor markets,
and tried to uncover their joint in￿ uence on the unemployment rate.
The following section revisits and updates estimates of equations (19) and
(20) , and reinterprets them through the lens of the New Keynesian model
developed above. In addition, an empirical assessment of the NKWPC (14)
18that does not rely on the assumption of an exogenous univariate process for
the unemployment rate
4 Empirical Evidence
The present section provides an empirical assessment of the NKWPC devel-
oped above. More speci￿cally, I want to evaluate to what extent a version of
the NKWPC with a constant natural rate can account for the joint behavior
of unemployment and wage in￿ ation in the U.S. economy.
First, I use simple statistics and graphical tools to seek evidence of a prima
facie negative relationship between wage in￿ ation and unemployment of the
sort predicted by the theory. Secondly, I compare the observed behavior
of wage in￿ ation with that predicted by an estimated version of the model
above, conditional on the unemployment rate.14 I do so using two alternative
approaches. First, I estimate the single equation model for wage in￿ ation
implied by assumption of a simple univariate process for the unemployment
rate. Then I relax the latter assumption, and use an empirical strategy
based on Campbell and Shiller (1987) that imposes no restrictions on the
information set used to predict the unemployment rate.
The empirical analysis relies on quarterly postwar U.S. data drawn from
the Haver database. I use the civilian unemployment rate as my measure
of unemployment. All measures of price in￿ ation are constructed using the
consumer price index. There are two main alternative sources for average
wage data that one may use to construct measures of wage in￿ ation: the
14The observability of the unemployment rate, may be viewed as an advantage of the
present framework relative to Sbordone (2006), who focuses instead on a parameterized
version of (5).
19earnings data for production and non-supervisory workers from the Estab-
lishment Survey (starting in 1964Q1), and the compensation data from the
"Productivity and Costs" publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (avail-
able from 1948Q1 onwards). Aside from their time span, the main di⁄erence
between the two is that "compensation" is a more encompassing measure of
the cost to the employer, and as such it includes employer contributions to
employee-bene￿t plans or irregular bonuses, whereas "earnings" is restricted
to wage income proper (including premium pay for overtime). Unfortunately,
and as noted by several authors, the discrepancy between their implied in-
￿ ation measures is far from negligible.15 This is made clear by Figure 2,
which plots wage in￿ ation based on both measures. Note that in this and
subsequent ￿gures ￿ though not in the formal econometric work below￿ wage
in￿ ation is measured as the centered four-quarter di⁄erence of the log nom-
inal wage expressed in percent terms (i.e., 100*(wt+2 ￿ wt￿2)), in order to
smooth the high volatility associated with quarter-to-quarter log-di⁄erences.
Three features stand out in Figure 2. First, the two measures display
very similar medium-run patterns, both picking up during the Great In￿ a-
tion episode, dropping during the Volcker disin￿ ation, and ￿ uctuating around
a low and stable mean during the Great Moderation years. This is re￿ ected
in their high contemporaneous correlation (0:82). Secondly, their mean val-
ues in the common sample period are noticeably di⁄erent: 4:44 percent for
the earnings-based measure, 5:36 percent for the compensation-based one.
Finally, and perhaps more strikingly, the compensation-based measure ap-
pears far more volatile than the earnings-based measure, especially over the
15See, e.g. Abraham, Spletzer and Stewart (1999).
20past two decades. A possible explanation for the di⁄erence in volatility lies in
the inclusion of the payo⁄s from the exercise of employee stock options in the
compensation measure. As argued by Mehran and Tracy (2001), the impact
of changes in that (increasingly important) component of compensation on
wage in￿ ation is substantial, even if it only accounts for a small fraction of
overall compensation.
Interestingly, and those di⁄erences notwithstanding, both measures are
used in empirical macro applications, often with little or no discussion regard-
ing the choice. While the compensation-based measure has an advantage in
its longer span, its sizable high frequency variations render it somewhat sus-
picious, and suggest the presence of substantial measurement error. Thus, in
the empirical analysis below I will use the earnings-based wage in￿ ation as a
baseline measure, but will check and discuss the robustness of the main ￿nd-
ings to the use of the alternative, compensation-based, wage in￿ ation mea-
sure. Perhaps surprisingly, given the seemingly large di⁄erences observed in
Figure 1, none of the key qualitative ￿ndings in the empirical analysis below
hinge on the choice of wage in￿ ation measure.
4.1 A Quick Glance at the Data
The New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve derived in section 3 implies an
inverse relation between wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate, albeit
not a simple or contemporaneous one, especially in the presence of indexation.
As a ￿rst pass in the empirical assessment of the model it seems natural to
check whether the raw data hint at any such inverse relation.
Figure 3 displays two scatterplots of wage in￿ ation and the unemploy-
21ment rate for the U.S. economy, using both measures of wage in￿ ation. The
scatterplots reveal the absence of a stable negative relation between the two
variables. Similar graphs, though typically focusing on price in￿ ation, have
often been used to demonstrate "the empirical failure of the Phillips curve."
That visual impression is con￿rmed by the correlation between the two series,
which is as low as 0:02 and ￿0:01, respectively.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of unemployment and wage in￿ ation over
time, using the earnings-based measure of the latter. While no stable relation
seems evident at a ￿rst glance, a more careful examination points to a strong
inverse relation starting sometime around the mid-1980s and prevailing up to
the end of the sample. That inverse relation is con￿rmed by the scatterplots
of Figure 5, which are now restricted to the post-1984 period, i.e. the so-called
Great Moderation era. For the restricted sample period the correlations are
￿0:76 and ￿0:27, respectively.
Figure 6 adds a temporal dimension to the Phillips curve scatterplots ini-
tially shown in Figure 3, now restricted to the earnings-based wage in￿ ation
It suggests that the paths of U.S. wage in￿ ation and unemployment have
completed a full circle, returning in recent years to the same downward locus
that characterized the 1960s. The evidence thus points to the presence of
a stable negative relation between wage in￿ ation and unemployment during
periods of relatively low and stable price in￿ ation. That relation is broken
during transitions from low to high in￿ ation (early 70s), or from high to low
in￿ ation (the early 80s), leading to an overall lack of correlation, as suggested
by Figure 3.
Thus, it seems clear from the previous quick glance at the data that
22any model that implies a simple inverse relation between wage in￿ ation and
unemployment will be at odds with the behavior of those two variables during
the long 1970-1985 episode. Yet, one cannot rule out that extensions of such
a model which allow for indexation to price in￿ ation may be consistent with
the evidence. I explore that hypothesis in the next subsection, using the
augmented version of the New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve.
Why has the re-emergence of a stable negative relation between wage in-
￿ ation and unemployment over the past two decades gone unnoticed among
academic economists? A possible explanation lies in the focus on price in￿ a-
tion and away from wage in￿ ation in much of the empirical research of recent
years, combined with a lack of a signi￿cant empirical relation between price
in￿ ation and unemployment. The correlation between those two series over
the post-1984 period is low and insigni￿cant (￿0:13), and its negative value
is due exclusively to the most recent observations: if I end the sample period
in 2007Q4 the correlation becomes even smaller in absolute value and has
the wrong sign (0:08). Of course, the theory developed above has nothing to
say, by itself, about the relation between price in￿ ation and the unemploy-
ment rate, since that relation is likely to be in￿ uenced by factors other than
wage setting, including features of price setting and the evolution of labor
productivity, among others.16
Next I turn to a more formal empirical assessment of the New Keynesian
Wage Phillips curve.
16See, e.g. Blanchard and Gal￿ (2009) and Thomas (2009) for an analysis of the relation
between price in￿ ation and unemployment in a model with labor market frictions.
234.2 Estimates of the Reduced Form New Keynesian
Wage Phillips Curve
In the present subsection I report estimates of the reduced form wage equa-
tion (19). The focus on (19) is motivated by the good ￿t of an AR(2) process
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with any further lags of the unemployment rate not being signi￿cant.
For the empirical analysis I augment equation (19) with an error term
that re￿ ects the likely measurement error in the wage in￿ ation data, and
which I assume to be independent of unemployment at all leads and lags.
The estimated equation is thus:
￿
w
t = ￿ + ￿￿
p
t￿1 +  0b ut +  1b ut￿1 + ￿t
where ￿t is a zero mean, possibly autocorrelated error term. Note that, under
the assumptions above, the wage in￿ ation equation should have a negative
coe¢ cient on the current unemployment rate and a positive one on its lag, in
addition to a positive coe¢ cient on lagged price in￿ ation in the presence of
indexation. Furthermore, note that the model (19) implies the cross-equation
restriction  1 =  0￿￿2, which can be easily tested conditional on a value for
￿, which I set to 0:99.
Table 1 reports OLS estimates of several speci￿cations of the wage in-
￿ ation equation, each of which can be seen as a restricted version of (19).
In all cases robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The wage in-
￿ ation data is based on the earnings series, and the sample period starts in
241964Q1. The ￿rst three columns report estimates including only the current
value of the unemployment rate, augmented in the case of columns (2) and
(3) with lagged quarter-to-quarter price in￿ ation (column (2)) and year-on-
year price in￿ ation (column (3)), with the latter expressed as a quarterly
rate to facilitate comparison of coe¢ cients. Note that when price in￿ ation is
not controlled for, the coe¢ cient on unemployment is very close to zero and
statistically insigni￿cant. When lagged in￿ ation is added as a regressor its co-
e¢ cient is highly signi￿cant, while the coe¢ cient on unemployment increases
in absolute value and becomes signi￿cant (though only at the 10 percent level
when quarter-to-quarter in￿ ation is used as a regressor). Columns (5) and
(6) include the lagged unemployment rate, and are thus consistent with the
speci￿cation implied by the model. In both cases the coe¢ cients on the un-
employment rates have the sign predicted by the theory, though they are only
signi￿cant when year-on-year price in￿ ation is used as the indexing variable.
Also, as shown in the row labeled p ￿ value, the cross-equation restriction
speci￿ed above cannot be rejected when both equations are estimated jointly.
The ￿nal two rows report the implied estimates of the Calvo wage rigidity
parameter ￿w, conditional on calibrated values for ’ and ￿w, since the three
parameters are not separately identi￿ed. Note that ’ is the inverse Frisch
labor supply elasticity, a controversial parameter. I consider two alternative
calibrations, ’ = 1 and ’ = 5, which span the range of values often assumed
in the literature. Given ’, I use (12) to set ￿w to a value consistent with a
natural rate of unemployment of 5 percent, which is roughly the average un-
employment rate over the sample period considered.17 The point estimates
17Note that ￿w = (1 ￿ expf￿’ung)￿1. This implies setting ￿w = 20:5 when ’ = 1, and
￿w = 4:52 when ’ = 5.
25range from 0:62 to 0:89, suggesting substantial wage rigidities, with those
associated with the ’ = 5 calibration implying average durations that may
be viewed as implausibly long (though the non-negligible size of the standard
errors allow for more plausible underlying degrees of wage rigidity).
A more detailed analysis of the ￿t of the estimated wage equations re-
ported in columns (5) and (6), suggests a poor ￿t during the recent recession.
The reason is simple : the rapid increase in the unemployment rate and the
very low levels of price in￿ ation (which became de￿ ation for some quarters),
lead the ￿tted wage equation to predict substantial nominal wage de￿ ation.
While actual wage in￿ ation was brought down by the recession, it has always
remained positive. The presence of downward nominal wage rigidities, which
are ignored in the standard wage setting model developed above, could in
principle account for that poor ￿t. Motivated by that observation, columns
(7) and (8) in Table 1 report estimates of the wage equation using data up to
2007Q4, thus avoiding any distortion resulting from the use of recent data.
Note that for both speci￿cations, the coe¢ cients on current and lagged un-
employment increase substantially and now become highly signi￿cant even
when quarter-to-quarter price in￿ ation is used as a regressor. Figure 7 dis-
plays actual and ￿tted wage in￿ ation, using the estimates shown in column
(8). While the estimated model misses much of the high frequency variations,
it appears to capture well most movements at medium-term frequencies, with
the exception of the spikes in 1971-72 and 1976-77. The correlation between
the two series is 0:83.
Table 2 reports estimates of wage in￿ ation equations using the measure
based on compensation, and with the sample period starting in 1948Q1. Most
26of the ￿ndings in Table 1 appear to be robust to the use of the alternative
wage in￿ ation measure, which is indeed surprising given the large discrepan-
cies between the two in￿ ation measures. Note however that the exclusion of
post-2007 data does not have much of an impact now, possibly because of
its reduced weight in the longer sample period. In particular, the coe¢ cients
on unemployment and its lagged value in column (5) are now signi￿cant, in
addition of having the right pattern of signs and relative magnitude.
4.3 A Measure of Fundamental Wage In￿ ation in the
Spirit of Campbell-Shiller
In the previous subsection I reported estimates of a reduced form wage in-
￿ ation equation implied by the NKWPC, under the assumption that the
unemployment rate follows an exogenous, univariate AR(2) process. While
the previous assumption provides a fairly good approximation to the dy-
namics of unemployment in the postwar period and leads to a reduced form
speci￿cation which makes contact with that used in Phillips (1958) and in
subsequent applied work, one may legitimately wonder whether the favorable
empirical assessment of the NKWPC hinges on that assumption. Relaxing
that assumption has an additional justi￿cation: simple Granger-causality
tests reject the null of no-Granger causality from wage and price in￿ ation to
unemployment. Thus, in particular, the four lags of (earnings-based) wage
in￿ ation and price in￿ ation are signi￿cant at the one percent level in a regres-
sion of the unemployment rate on its own four lags and the lags of the two
in￿ ation measures over the 1964Q1-2009Q3 sample period. An analogous
test using the compensation-based measure of wage in￿ ation and extended
27over the sample period 1948Q1-2009Q3 only rejects the null of no-Granger
causality at the 7 percent signi￿cance level.
Motivated by the previous observation, and in the spirit of Campbell
and Shiller￿ s (1987) proposed assessment of present value relations, I start











where vector ￿ ￿ [￿;￿w;￿;￿w;’] collects the exogenous parameters of the






t￿1￿q] for some ￿nite
q. Under the null hypothesis that model (14) holds exactly (i.e. in the
absence of measurement error and with a constant natural unemployment
rate), it is easy to check that e ￿
w
t (￿) = ￿w
t , for all t. In other words, given
the structure of the conditioning variable zt the use of a limited information
set is not restrictive under the null.
Next I estimate e ￿
w
t (￿) and plot it against actual wage in￿ ation, to eval-
uate the extent to which the simple model developed here can explain ob-
served ￿ uctuations in that variable. I assume that the joint dynamics of
unemployment and wage in￿ ation are well captured by the ￿rst order vector
autoregressive model
zt = A zt￿1 + "t
where Ef"tj zt￿1g = 0 for all t. Thus, and letting ei denote the ith unit










28I exploit the previous result to construct a time series for fundamental
in￿ ation e ￿
w
t (￿) using a minimum distance estimator. Since not all structural
parameters in ￿ are separately identi￿ed, I calibrate three of them (￿;￿w;’)
and estimate the remaining two (￿;￿w), which de￿ne the degree of rigidities
and indexation. As above, I set ￿ = 0:99 and report results for both ’ = 1
and ’ = 5, with ￿w set to imply a natural unemployment rate of 5 percent in





t (￿))2 subject to (21), over all possible values (￿w;￿) 2 [0;1]￿
[0;1], and given the calibrated values for (￿;￿w;’) and the OLS estimate
for matrix A (with q = 4). As in the empirical analysis above I use lagged
quarterly and annual in￿ ation as an indexing variable, and both earnings-
based and compensation-based measures of wage in￿ ation.
Table 3 reports the main results for the exercise.18 The estimates of ￿,
the degree of indexation, are always highly signi￿cant and lie between 0:52
and 0:83, depending on the speci￿cation, values which are slightly higher
than those obtained in the previous subsection. The point estimates for the
Calvo parameter ￿w are also highly signi￿cant in all cases. Under the ’ = 1
assumption they lie between 0:52 and 0:65, implying an average duration
between two and three quarters. When ’ = 5 is assumed, the estimates are
substantially higher (between 0:75 and 0:82), but still within the range of
plausibility, given the evidence uncovered by micro studies.19 Interestingly,
my estimates for ￿ and ￿w are very close to those obtained by Smets and
Wouters (2007) using a very di⁄erent approach (and one that does not use
18Standard errors are obtained by drawing from the empirical distribution of A, and
re-estimating ￿w and ￿ for each draw.
19See, e.g., Taylor (1999).
29information on the unemployment rate, among other di⁄erences): 0:58 and
0:7, respectively.
The "multivariate" model analyzed here implies some restrictions that
can be subject to formal testing. In particular, note that if model (14) holds
exactly (i.e. with neither measurement error nor variations in the natural




satis￿ed. Unfortunately the latter can be rejected at low signi￿cance levels
for our sample and baseline calibration. This may not be surprising, given
the simplicity of the model and the likely importance of measurement error.
But, following Campbell and Shiller (1987), I seek a more informal evaluation
of the model by comparing actual and fundamental wage in￿ ation. The last
row of Table 3 displays the correlation between the four-quarter centered
moving averages of both variables: the correlations are positive and high
(above 0:75) in all cases, suggesting a good ￿t of the model. This is also
illustrated in Figure 8, which displays actual (earnings-based) wage in￿ ation
and fundamental wage in￿ ation, where the latter is based on the estimates
using year-on-year price in￿ ation as an indexing variable and ’ = 1. While
the ￿t is far from perfect, it is clear that the model-based series captures
pretty well the bulk of the low and medium frequency ￿ uctuations in actual
wage in￿ ation (with the exception of some episodes, including the 2008-09
recession). The fact that such a good ￿t is obtained using a model for wage
in￿ ation that assumes a constant natural rate of unemployment makes that
￿nding perhaps even more surprising.
Given the large ￿ uctuations in price in￿ ation over the sample period
considered and the well known positive correlation between price and wage
30in￿ ation, one may wonder to what extent the high correlation between ac-
tual and fundamental in￿ ation is largely a consequence of indexation to past
price in￿ ation. In order to address that question I construct a measure of the
"cyclical" component of fundamental in￿ ation, by subtracting from the latter
the in￿ ation indexation component, ￿￿
p
t￿1. The cyclical component is thus
driven exclusively by current and anticipated future unemployment rates.
Figure 9 displays the cyclical component of fundamental in￿ ation thus con-
structed, together with actual wage in￿ ation. It is clear from that evidence
that while the cyclical component did not have a dominant role in accounting
for the ￿ uctuations in wage in￿ ation in the Great In￿ ation era, one can still
detect several episodes in which it shapes the shorter-term ￿ uctuations in ob-
served wage in￿ ation, including the 1968-69 hump and the 1974-75 trough.
It is not until the advent of the Great Moderation period and the associated
stability in price in￿ ation that the cyclical component of fundamental wage
in￿ ation emerges as a central factor behind ￿ uctuations in wage in￿ ation, as
Figure 9 makes clear.
5 Concluding comments
In his seminal 1958 paper, A.W. Phillips uncovered a tight inverse relation
between unemployment and wage in￿ ation in the U.K.. That relation was
largely abandoned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. From a the-
oretical viewpoint, it was not clear why the rate of change of the nominal
wage (as opposed to the level of the real wage) should be related to unem-
ployment. From an empirical viewpoint, economists￿attention shifted to the
relation between price in￿ ation and unemployment, but hopes of establishing
31a stable relationship between those variables faded with the stag￿ ation of the
1970s.
The present paper has made two main contributions. First, it provides
some theoretical foundations to a Phillips-like relation between wage in￿ ation
and unemployment. It does so not by developing a new model but, instead, by
showing that such a relation underlies a standard New Keynesian framework
with staggered wage setting, even though versions of the latter found in
the literature do not explicitly incorporate or even discuss unemployment.
Secondly, the implied wage equation is shown to account reasonably well for
the comovement of wage in￿ ation and the unemployment rate in the U.S.
economy, even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate of
unemployment. In particular, that equation can explain the strong negative
comovement between wage in￿ ation and unemployment observed during the
past two decades of price stability.
It is far from the objective of the present paper to claim that the stag-
gered wage setting model of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) provides an
accurate description of the U.S. labor market. It is clear that some of its
underlying assumptions,￿ most noticeably, the unilateral setting of the wage
by a monopoly union￿ are at odds with arrangements prevailing in most sec-
tors. Yet, as a matter of fact, the EHL structure underlies most of the
medium-scale DSGE models that have been developed in recent years, by
both academics and institutions. Identifying and testing further predictions
coming out of those models would seem a worthy undertaking and a source of
guidance in any e⁄ort to improve the frameworks available for policy analysis.
In that spirit, and in ongoing work that follows up on the present paper
32(Gal￿ (2010)), I have shown that a calibrated version of the standard New
Keynesian model generates ￿ uctuations in the unemployment rate that dis-
play properties similar to those observed in the data. In addition, I show how
the unemployment rate can be used to construct a measure of the model-
based output gap (i.e. the log deviation between output and its e¢ cient
level), and discuss the desirability of having the central bank respond to the
unemployment rate (in addition to in￿ ation).
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38Table 1. Estimated Wage In￿ ation Equations: Earnings-based









































p ￿ value 0:71 0:52 0:67 0:06

















￿￿Table 2. Estimated Wage In￿ ation Equations: Compensation-based









































p ￿ value 0:57 0:79 0:54 0:66



































































Figure 1: The Wage Markup and the Unemployment Rate
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